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DRILLING FOR ADMIRALTY: THE OCSLA 




 Maritime law is ultimately driven by commerce. The seas 
were—and continue to be—one of the easiest ways to transfer goods 
over large distances. Yet maritime commerce has a relative new-
comer that is not shipping or transportation focused—offshore 
drilling. Should admiralty and maritime law, intended to protect 
seamen and keep ships engaged in maritime commerce apply to 
personal injury claims on drilling rigs on the Outer Continental 
Shelf? This Note argues that they should not apply for two rea-
sons. In Lozman v. Riviera Beach, the Supreme Court announced 
that a “vessel” should appear to the reasonable observer as in-
tended to carry a person or things over water. Because a maritime 
tort requires a “vessel,” and the Lozman definition thereof suggests 
that drilling rigs are not “vessels,” admiralty and maritime law 
generally cannot apply to torts on drilling rigs. Moreover, Congress 
was explicit in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act that struc-
tures engaged in drilling were to be treated as enclaves of federal 
law in some “upland state.” Because the OCSLA is clear that it 
intends federal law such as the Long Shore Harbor Worker Com-
pensation Act to apply to drill platform workers, admiralty and the 
general maritime law should not apply to drilling-related torts 
occurring on such rigs. 
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA in History and 
German, Wake Forest University, 2013. I would like to thank my friends and 
family for their love and support, as well as the staff of the William & Mary 
Business Law Review, both present and past. 
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INTRODUCTION
 In fiscal year 2016, the offshore drilling industry in the 
United States was responsible for 315,000 jobs and $30 billion in 
the US economy.1 Offshore drilling is a dangerous profession, ex-
posing its workers to both the perils of the sea as well as the 
dangers of heavy machinery and drilling for explosive substances 
and under extreme pressures; for example, The Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) reported 77 fires, 3 ex-
plosions, and 19 gas releases on offshore rigs during calendar year 
2018.2 2018 resulted in 171 injuries and 1 fatality, one of the better 
years recently reported.3 For employers engaged in this billions 
of dollars interest, liability is certainly a big financial concern.4
 Congress acted to create a workers’ compensation scheme 
on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).5 In a rare moment of clar-
ity, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 
1953, along with a subsequent amendment in 1978.6 The Act 
stated that Federal law applies to artificial islands and fixed 
structures placed on the OCS for the purpose of resource explo-
ration and collection as if the structure were an area of “Federal 
jurisdiction located within a State.”7 In turn, the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA) listed drilling work 
on an offshore rig as a status and situs for its workers’ compen-
sation scheme.8
1 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTIONS 1, https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/oil-and-gas-energy 
-program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/2019-2024/DPP/NP-Economic-Benefits 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WYR-98NN]. 
2 Offshore Incident Statistics, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENV’T ENF’T, https://www 
.bsee.gov/stats-facts/offshore-incident-statistics [https://perma.cc/3HD9-FGVR]. 
3 See id.
4 See generally In re “Deepwater Horizon,” 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 
2011) (Class action suit involving the explosion, fire, and sinking of the DEEP-
WATER HORIZON mobile offshore drilling unit, causing the release of millions 
of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico). 
5 A discussion of the application of state law within three nautical miles (nm) 
of the coast is beyond the scope of this Note. 
6 See generally Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-372, § 101 92 Stat. 631 (1978) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. (2018)). 
7 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 4(a)(1) 67 Stat. 
642 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2018)). 
8 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018). 
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 But the courts have continued to apply admiralty jurisdic-
tion and the general maritime law to workers’ injuries on drilling 
rigs, despite the statutory obligation to apply the LHWCA through 
the OCSLA.9 The result has been to apply the LHWCA to fixed 
platforms, as in those that cannot move under their own propul-
sion, while allowing the general maritime law and admiralty ju-
risdiction to apply to self-propelled rigs.10 The courts label those 
in this former category as “vessels” under 1 U.S.C. section 3.11
Because such rigs are “vessels,” injured employees may qualify as 
“seamen,” meaning they can bring a Jones Act Negligence claim 
in a state court for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.12
Moreover, the employer may be liable for Maintenance and Cure 
as well as an unseaworthiness claim.13
 Uncertainty is bad for business.14 Currently, drilling em-
ployers and rig owners are subject to two schemes of employee 
liability.15 This Note argues that applying the general maritime 
law to self-propelled rigs is inappropriate under the OCSLA be-
cause Congress made it clear in both the text of the Act and the 
legislative history that the general maritime law was not to ap-
ply to drilling rigs.16 Moreover, the Note argues that drilling rigs 
are not “vessels,” so the courts could simply reject the traditional 
trinity of seamen’s tort claims based on the structure not being a 
vessel, therefore the claimant cannot be a “seaman.”17
9 See infra Section II.C. 
10 Compare BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp. 3d 
658, 662 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit establishes 
that mobile offshore drilling units are vessels under general maritime law.”), 
with Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 361 (1969) (“[S]ince the 
[OCSLA] provides an alternative federal remedy ... there is no reason to as-
sume that Congress intended to extend those principles to create an admiralty 
remedy [on a fixed drilling rig].”). 
11 BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662. 
12 Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049, 1053 
(5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n the area of personal injury, admiralty jurisdiction and 
the applicability of maritime law to these Robison-defined special-purpose 
watercraft is unassailably established.”). 
13 See id. at 1052. 
14Business Processes and Risk Management, EK INTERACTIVE, https://ektin 
teractive.com/business-processes-risk-management/ [https://perma.cc/QN3B-3L 
RK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
15 See infra Part I. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part II. 
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 The Note first discusses the history behind the develop-
ment of offshore drilling as well as a brief primer on the distinc-
tion between admiralty jurisdiction and the general maritime 
law.18 The Note then delves into when maritime torts arise and 
questions of whether drilling rigs are vessels and the implica-
tions for employers that follow therefrom.19 From there, the Note 
discusses the OCSLA and Congress’s clear intent to exclude ad-
miralty and the general maritime law.20 Finally, the Note suggests 
two approaches to ending the divide: (1) courts could find drill-
ing rigs not to be vessels, or (2) courts begin to apply the OCSLA 
as it is written, and acknowledge Congress’s decision to exclude 
drilling rigs from admiralty.21
I. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW
A. Federal Common Law 
 It is important to note that there is a difference between 
the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction.22 Maritime 
law is a self-contained body of substantive law, much like how a 
state has its own law separate from its sister states.23 Indeed it 
is a body of federal common law, belying the notion that there is 
no federal common law.24
 Admiralty jurisdiction, like diversity and federal question  
jurisdictions, is given to Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. section 
1333.25 A court sitting in admiralty must apply the General Mari-
time law;26 however, a maritime cause of action does not necessi-
tate admiralty jurisdiction.27 A plaintiff must invoke admiralty 
in her pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), should 
she want access to its unique features such as vessel arrest and 
18 See infra Section I.A.
19 See infra Sections I.B, I.C. 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 See infra Part III.
22 See 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 4-1, at 
146 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed.]. 
23 See id.
24 Id. But see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no 
federal general common law.”). 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 3-1, at 66. 
26 SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 3-1, at 166. 
27 See id.
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limitation of liability.28 However, a court sitting in a different 
jurisdiction such as diversity must apply the general maritime law 
if there is a maritime cause of action.29 Thus, meeting the threshold 
of a maritime cause of action is necessary for the application of 
the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, but not 
sufficient for admiralty jurisdiction.
 Related to pleading, admiralty also possesses the unique 
“savings to suitors” clause.30 In effect, anyone who wishes to bring 
an admiralty claim may bring it either in state court or federal 
court.31 Maritime claims are not removable on the basis of admi-
ralty jurisdiction,32 however, they are removable on diversity or 
supplemental jurisdiction.33 This in turn creates questions as to 
whether the claimant may demand a jury hearing.34 Admiralty 
jurisdiction does not allow for a jury.35
1. Maritime Tort and Grubart
 Maritime tort is a body of law of a different origin from that 
of conventional common law tort.36 The general maritime law has 
developed separately from land-based law,37 so much so that 
maritime negligence developed under a different set of cases from 
standard negligence.38
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. A. 
29 Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 
2002); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 4-3, at 156 (“[T]he general mari-
time law, when in conflict with state law, is supreme.”). 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving 
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”). 
31 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK 
SERIES § 2-4, at 109 (5th ed. & Suppl. 2012).  
32 Id. at 113. 
33 Id. at 111. 
34 Id. at 926. 
35 Id.
36 Id. at 117. 
37 See 1 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:4, at 
1–8 (5th ed. & Supp. 2018–2019) (“[T]he Constitution has been interpreted as 
conferring authority in both Congress and the courts sitting in admiralty to 
formulate substantive rules to be applied in cases that fall within admiralty 
jurisdiction.”); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 31, § 3-2, at 119 (“[In Leathers v. 
Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882),] the Supreme Court recognized the maritime 
tort of negligence which exists as a counterpart to state law negligence.”). 
38 Id.
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 Regardless of whether an action is brought under admiralty 
jurisdiction,39 to be “maritime” the tort must “sound[ ] in admi-
ralty.”40 This is more than simply occurring on navigable wa-
ters.41 The current test to determine a maritime tort, as elaborated 
in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., is a 
two-prong test.42 The claim must (1) occur on navigable waters; 
and (2) have a nexus to traditional maritime activity (TMA).43 The 
second prong has two subparts: (a) does the event affect mari-
time commerce; and (b) is the activity a TMA.44
 The second prong and its subparts are often the subjects 
of argument.45 The Grubart court stressed that simply occurring 
over water does not make an activity a TMA.46 The character of
the event must be maritime.47 The circuits have been left to their 
own devices to determine what activities have a sufficiently mari-
time character to be a TMA, occasionally skirting around the 
Grubart court’s examples.48 In general, the courts have read in a 
“vessel” requirement to the TMA, as in the harm must occur on 
a vessel.49
39 See supra text accompanying notes 25–29. 
40 Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2002). 
41 Id. at 131–32 (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)). Historically, simply occurring on naviga-
ble waters was sufficient for a claim to be maritime in nature. See Hough v. 
Western Transp. Co. (The Plymouth), 70 U.S. 20, 36 (1865) (“Every species of 
tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the 
high seas or navigable water, is of admiralty cognizance.”). 
42 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. 
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 532–34 (recounting the history of disputes and precedential 
opinions concerning the evolution of the nexus prong). 
46 Id. at 541 (describing the malfunction of a washer/drier aboard a vessel 
in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), as “hardly maritime”). 
47 See id. at 538 (stating that the event must be described as an “interme-
diate level of possible generality”); see also Germain v. Ficarra, 824 F.3d 258, 272 
(2d Cir. 2016) (applying an intermediate level of possible generality by describing 
an accident in which the plaintiff jumped from the boat and hit his head on a rock 
as an “injury to a passenger who jumped from a vessel on open navigable waters”). 
48 Compare Grubart, 513 U.S. at 541 (describing onboard washer/drier 
malfunction as “hardly maritime”), with Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines 
Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that a slip-and-fall in a cruise ship 
shower is a TMA). 
49 De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a moored riverboat casino was not a “vessel”); see also Monica 
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 Despite the requirement of a vessel, a maritime tort may 
occur on land.50 Congress passed the Admiralty Extension Act 
(AEA) in 1948.51 The AEA extends admiralty to any case or 
damage “caused by a vessel on navigable water,” even if the damage 
occurred on land.52 While the intent was to extend admiralty ju-
risdiction, it applies to Grubart and the substantive maritime 
tort analysis as well.53
 In the context of the outer continental shelf, the Fifth Cir-
cuit holds offshore drilling activities to not be a TMA stating, 
“[i]ndeed, observing that the Court had previously ‘held that 
drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction,’ we in-
dicated that drilling platforms were not even suggestive of tradi-
tional maritime affairs.”54 Thus tort claims on fixed rigs cannot 
be brought under the general maritime law through simply occur-
ring on navigable water because they cannot satisfy the nexus 
requirement’s TMA subpart.55
 The statute and case law demonstrate that under the lan-
guage of the act, a “vessel” must cause the tort in order to be 
maritime.56 Thus if a harm occurs on an apparatus that is con-
sidered, in effect, a piece of land, in order for the general mari-
time law and admiralty jurisdiction to apply, there must be a vessel 
causing the harm under Grubart.57 Therefore, if a drilling rig is 
Thoele, Note, Throwing Admiralty Jurisdiction A Lifevest: Preserving Jurisdiction 
for Maritime Torts That Do Not Involve Vessels, 55 B.C. L. REV. 979, 994–95 
(2014) (arguing that Grubart does not contain an explicit “vessel” requirement 
and that lower courts have drifted by incorporating such a requirement). 
50 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36. 
51 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK 
SERIES § 1-4, at 20 (3d ed. & Suppl. 2001). 
52 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2018); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 532. 
53 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 
474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding a non-vessel casino boat causing harm 
on land did not meet the Grubart nexus test thus the tort was not maritime). 
54 Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985). The platform in 
question was fixed. The court based its logic on Congressional intent via the 
OCSLA. Id.
55 See id.; see also Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. Naturally this excludes alli-
sion scenarios with a vessel, which would qualify under the AEA. See 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30101(a) (2018). 
56 Id.; Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187. 
57 § 30101(a); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187. 
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not a “vessel,” the only foreseeable way for a maritime tort to arise 
under Grubart is an allusion.58 Yet the question remains whether 
such a tort would be maritime if the rig in question is a “vessel.”59
B. What Is a Vessel? 
 Congress has defined a “vessel” as “every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of be-
ing used, as a means of transportation on water.”60 Historically, 
this resulted in a very broad test, that would have included 
“three men in a tub” and “Jonah inside the whale” as vessels.61
 But things changed in 2013 with Lozman v. Riviera Beach.62
Fane Lozman, the owner of a floating home in South Florida, 
docked his home in Riviera Beach.63 Lozman’s home was not a 
traditional houseboat; it was a traditional home built upon a 
barge.64 It had little resemblance to a boat or ship.65 After disputes 
between Lozman and the town concerning Lozman’s change of 
residence to the town’s marina, the town attempted to recoup 
docking fees and seek trespass damages by seizing the home as 
a “vessel” under supplemental admiralty rule C, eventually de-
stroying the home.66 The lower courts found Lozman’s home to be 
a “vessel.”67 But the Supreme Court reversed.68 The Court clari-
fied that the test for a “vessel” is whether “a reasonable observer, 
looking to the [craft’s] physical characteristics and activities, would 
58 See § 30101(a). 
59 See generally Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling LLC, 376 F. Supp. 3d 
726 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (personal injury suit arising from employee’s injury 
while working on a drilling rig). 
60 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2018). 
61 Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1982). 
62 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121 (2013). See generally David 
W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does 
Lozman Set A New Course?, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 393 (2013). 
63 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 118. 
64 “The home consisted of a house-like plywood structure with French doors 
on three sides. It contained a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, 
along with a stairway leading to a second level with office space. An empty 
bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat.” Id. (citations omitted). 
65 Id. at 122 (noting the lack of watertight portholes). 
66 Id. at 118–20. 
67 Id. at 119. 
68 Id. at 131. 
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consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or 
things over water.”69 The Court stressed the practical ability to 
carry people over water, distinguishing it from the mere theoret-
ical ability to do so.70
 The Court rejected previous broad tests, which could be 
simply be described as an “if it floats” test.71 In determining that 
Lozman’s floating home was not a vessel, the Court considered 
factors including propulsion, ease, and frequency of moving the 
craft, ability to carry persons or cargo over water.72 The Court 
even found the non-ship-like nature of the home in its analysis 
stating, “[the home’s] small rooms looked like ordinary nonmari-
time living quarters. And those inside those rooms looked out 
upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through 
French doors or ordinary windows.”73 The Court also rejected an 
argument that the home was actually used for transportation, 
noting that Lozman moved the home far too infrequently.74
Lozman’s legacy is a wholly objective test.75 It does not 
matter if the craft’s designer intended for the craft to be a “ves-
sel.”76 The question is whether a reasonable observer would look 
at the features of the craft and decide that the vessel was de-
signed for the purpose of waterborne transportation, not merely 
theoretically capable of performing such tasks.77
69 Id. at 118. 
70 Id. at 121. 
71 Id. at 120–21. 
72 Id. at 130. The Court also noted, 
But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home sug-
gests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport 
persons or things over water. It had no rudder or other steer-
ing mechanism. Its hull was unraked and it had a rectangular 
bottom 10 inches below the water. It had no special capacity 
to generate or store electricity but could obtain that utility only 
through ongoing connections with the land. 
Id. at 121–22. 
73 Id. at 121. 
74 Id. at 130–31. 
75 David R. Maass, If It Looks Like a Vessel: The Supreme Court’s “Reason-
able Observer” Test for Vessel Status, 65 FLA. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013); see 
Lozman, 568 U.S. at 128. 
76 See Maass, supra note 75, at 904; see also Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121, 127–28. 
77 See Lozman, 568 U.S. at 128. 
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1. “Vessel” Status of Different Types of Drilling Rigs 
 There are multiple types of drilling rigs in use today.78 They 
can be broken into two families, self-propelled and fixed.79 Fixed 
rigs can be split further into permanently attached and floating 
rig categories.80 Permanently attached rigs are connected to the 
seafloor by stilts, piling, or some other permanent structure.81
Appropriately, they are never classified as vessels and have even 
been referred to as “artificial islands” by the Supreme Court.82
 Floating fixed rigs are towed to a location where they are 
then moored to the seafloor for drilling operations.83 Two oil rigs 
of this type are Spars and Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).84 Spars 
are a large cylinder that extends deep into the water, but not to the 
bottom.85 They are attached to the bottom by an intricate system 
of cables.86 Similarly, TLPs are attached to the bottom via cables 
and an apparatus known as a “tension leg.”87 Spars and TLPs have 
been considered not to be “vessels.”88 Indeed, these types of rigs 
78 See generally Kabir Sadeghi, An Overview of Design, Analysis, Construc-
tion and Installation of Offshore Petroleum Platforms Suitable for Cyprus Oil/Gas 
Fields, 2 GAU J. SOC. & APPL. SCI. 1, 1–7 (2007). While this article is oriented 
towards the Mediterranean Sea, the same type of rigs are used in the United 
States. See Identifying the Various Types of Drilling Rigs Available for Sale,
HENDERSON RIGS & EQUIP., LLC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://hendersonrigs.com 
/identifying-various-types-drilling-rigs-available-sale/ [https://perma.cc/EKF5   
-CXLN] (listing various types of rigs available for sale in the United States). 
79 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 1–7. 
80 See id.
81 See id. at 4–7.
82 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969). It should be 
noted that a fixed structure that functions “in aid to navigation” avoids the 
vessel question for admiralty purposes—it is automatically allowed in admi-
ralty; however, this is limited to actual “aids to navigation,” i.e., channel markers, 
light towers, and other structures attached to the seafloor intended to aid ships 
in navigating. See id.
83 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 1–3, 5. 
84 See id. at 6–7.
85 Id. at 7. 
86 Id.
87 Id. at 6. 
88 Baker v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 834 F.3d 542, 547–48 
(5th Cir. 2016) (holding a TLP was not a vessel by applying the Lozman test); 
Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 770 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating Spars 
are not vessels); Ross v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 563 (E.D. 
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are akin to fixed platforms because their intricate mooring systems 
make it difficult to move them without thorough planning.89
 For the above-discussed rig types, courts have applied 
Lozman to demonstrate that they are not “vessels.”90 But the courts 
have refused to apply Lozman to self-propelled rigs, instead defer-
ring to pre-Lozman precedent.91 The two main rigs in this group 
are semi-submersibles and jack-up rigs.92
 Semi-submersibles look like traditional fixed rigs from above, 
but they float, staying in place by use of anchors and onboard 
engines. Moreover, they have a pontoon system to sink deep in 
the water to steady the rig.93 The Deepwater Horizon was this type 
of rig.94 They look nothing like what a reasonable person may 
consider intended to “carr[y] people or things over the water” 
upon observation.95 The Eastern District of Louisiana ignored 
the issue in 2015 in BW Offshore USA, LLC, simply stating that 
“[l]ong-standing precedent” established that mobile drilling rigs 
are vessels without addressing the Lozman reasonable observer 
analysis.96 Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit and her sister circuits 
La. 2018) (“The [spar] has never been used as a form of transportation as it is 
physically incapable of movement. The structure does not have a propulsion 
system or any other means of moving from itself from one location to another. 
Thus, it is both practically and theoretically incapable of movement.”). 
89 See Hefren, 820 F.3d at 770 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit ... ha[s] held that fixed, 
offshore platforms permanently affixed to the sea floor were immovable prop-
erty and that spars were akin to offshore platforms.”). 
90 Baker, 834 F.3d at 547; Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan M/V, 
551 Fed. Appx. 749, 751–52 (2015) (holding a spar to be a “non-vessel” under 
Lozman); see also Ross, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 563. 
91 BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp. 3d 658, 662 
(E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit establishes that mo-
bile offshore drilling units are vessels under general maritime law.”). 
92 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3. 
93 Id.
94 Deepwater Horizon, TRANSOCEAN, https://www.scribd.com/document/162 
405643/Deepwater-Horizon-Spec-Sheet (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (Spec-sheet 
for Deepwater Horizon).  
95 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 132–33 (2013). 
96 BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662. The court merely recited the Lozman 
test. Instead of applying the two-year-old test, the court deferred to long-
standing precedent. Id.; see also Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling LLC, 376 
F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (stating jack-up drilling platforms are 
vessels by citing previous, pre-Lozman Fifth Circuit cases and not analyzing 
Lozman), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 970 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2020). 
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have not had the opportunity to fully address the question fur-
ther,97 but the silence on the issue is noteworthy. 
 Jack-up rigs are a sort of hybrid between floating and 
fixed rigs.98 They are quite boatlike, able to move under their own 
power until they are jacked-up on stilts during drilling operations.99
The Fifth Circuit has long considered them to be “vessels.”100
C. Seamen, Longshore and Harbor Workers, and Tort 
 “Vessel” status is an important designation for admiralty.101
For employers and employees, it is the difference between a pre-
dictable worker’s compensation scheme and unpredictable litiga-
tion.102 The reason for the importance of the “vessel” designation 
is the related concept of “seaman” status.103
 A “seaman” is an employment status designation that brings 
with it certain legal rights.104 The designation depends on a work 
relationship to a legal “vessel.”105 To qualify as a “seaman,” “an em-
ployee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission [and] a seaman must have a connec-
tion to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such 
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature.”106
 Thus a “vessel” designation is necessary for seaman status 
and Jones Act actions.107 If a structure related to the employee’s 
work is not a “vessel,” then the employee is not a “seaman.”108
97 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK 
SERIES § 1-7, at 47 n.325 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed.]. 
98 See BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 663. 
99 Id.
100 Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir. 2002). 
101 See, e.g., BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (affirming that to apply 
maritime law, courts must first establish whether something at sea is a vessel). 
102 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-1, at 198. 
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2003). 
106 Id. at 387 (quoting Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995)) (em-
phasis added). 
107 Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(“The existence of a ‘vessel’ is thus crucial to determining seaman status under 
the Jones Act.”). 
108 See id.
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Accordingly, such an employee would not have access to tradi-
tional tort remedies available to “seamen,” such as Jones Act 
Negligence.109
 Seamen have long been considered the “wards of admiralty” 
and have been afforded a special position in its jurisprudence.110
Seamen have three causes of action against their employer: (1) 
Jones Act Negligence; (2) Unseaworthiness; and (3) Maintenance 
and Cure.111 Unseaworthiness and Maintenance and Cure are 
traditional General Maritime Law causes of action.112
1. Unseaworthiness and Maintenance & Cure 
 A vessel is seaworthy if it is “fit for [its] intended uses.”113
The vessel owner and employer114 have a duty to provide a sea-
worthy vessel to her seamen.115 It is clearly a claim that requires 
a vessel and its condition to cause the harm.116 Without a vessel 
there is no claim for unseaworthiness.117 Upon showing breach 
and causation, a seaman may receive pecuniary damages that 
generally mirror those available under the Jones Act.118
 A “seaman” who is harmed in the line of work may also 
receive maintenance and cure.119 This effectively covers hospital 
109 See id.
110 Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009). But
see Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (2019) (stating that seamen no 
longer have a special place in admiralty in holding that punitive damages are 
not available in unseaworthiness claims). 
111 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-1, at 198. 
112 See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
113 Drapela v. United States, 419 Fed. Appx. 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2011); see 
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971). 
114 This is a distinction that goes beyond the scope of this Note. The owner and 
employer are often different entities. There is a complex system of “chartering” 
in which an owner may effectively lease out her vessel to a time charterer who 
will crew the ship acting as an employer. See generally 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 11-1 (3d ed. 2001). 
115 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 548 (1960); The Osceola,
189 U.S. at 175. 
116 See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 548; The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. 
117 See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 547–48; The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. 
118 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-10, at 232; see infra note 128 
and accompanying text. 
119 See SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-19, at 280–81. 
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costs until “maximum cure”—the best available medical result—
and a daily allowance for the duration of the voyage.120 The “sea-
man” is also entitled to their wages for the rest of the voyage.121
A “seaman” may collect punitive damages for willful nonpayment of 
Maintenance and Cure.122
2. Jones Act Negligence 
 Historically, seamen were not able to sue their employers, 
masters, or fellow seamen for negligence.123 In reaction to the 
holding in The Osceola, Congress created the Jones Act.124 The 
Act created a negligence cause of action for seamen against em-
ployers, coworkers, and masters.125 Not only do seamen now 
have access to a negligence cause of action in addition to claims 
for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, but Jones Act 
negligence may carry a negligence standard lighter than that of 
land-based negligence.126
 The importance of the Jones Act claim for an employer is 
threefold. First, a Jones Act claim is a negligence claim.127 That 
120 Id. at 280–81. 
121 Id. at 281. 
122 Id. § 4-25, at 299. 
123 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The Court put forth four proposi-
tions about a seaman’s possible causes of action. Id. Propositions three and four 
held that a seaman cannot sue his “fellow servants” in negligence and could only 
recover maintenance and cure for injuries received through negligence. Id.
124 SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 6-20, at 317. Congress disagreed 
strongly with the third and fourth propositions in The Osceola Court’s opinion. 
Id. The Act was based substantially upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA). Id. § 6-21, at 322. 
125 Id. § 6-21, at 322. 
126 Id. at 329. There is a debate as to the standard of care required for Jones 
Act Negligence Claims. Id. Some jurisdictions advocate for a “slight negligence” 
while others consider the standard to be “ordinary negligence.” Id. at 330. This 
distinction goes beyond the purpose of this Note, however the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits—the two Circuits with the most drilling-related cases—have split on 
this issue with the Fifth Circuit adopting an “ordinary negligence standard.” 
Compare Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(“The reasonable person standard, therefore, and a Jones Act negligence action 
becomes one of the reasonable seaman in like circumstances”), with Havens v. 
F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven the slightest negli-
gence is sufficient to sustain a finding of liability.”). 
127 See SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 6-21, at 322. 
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means the claimant may be able to win damages similar to those in 
a normal negligence trial, such as loss of earnings and future earn-
ing potential; pain and suffering; and mental anguish.128 This is 
exacerbated by the second feature of a Jones Act claim—that the 
plaintiff may demand a jury.129 If it seems it cannot get any worse 
for a Jones Act defendant, it can: Jones Act claims are nonremova-
ble even if there is a non-admiralty basis of jurisdiction.130 Moreo-
ver, a Jones Act claim does not preclude claims for unseaworthiness 
or maintenance and cure, meaning they can go before a jury as 
well.131 Thus the Jones Act defendant may be required to defend 
in a biased forum against a jury.132 Imagine BP or Transocean 
defending a Jones Act claim in front of a jury in a Plaquemines 
Parish, Louisiana, State Courthouse; the Jones Act makes that 
possible, at least for claims arising on self-propelled rigs.133
3. Longshore and Harbor Workers 
 What of stevedores, maintenance people, and other harbor 
workers? Non-“seamen” do not have access to the Jones Act nor 
the other general maritime law remedies for seamen.134 Congress 
acted to help harbor workers135 following the result of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen,136 in which the Supreme Court found that 
the family of a stevedore who died in an accident while loading a 
ship, did not have access to a maritime remedy, nor the state work-
ers’ compensation act.137 Congress responded with the Longshore 
128 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-10, at 232–33. See generally 
id. § 4-10. 
129 Id. § 4-12, at 245. 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 247. 
132 Id. at 245–46 (discussing various jurisdictional options plaintiff has and 
limited options of defendant). 
133 See id.; see also BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp. 
3d 658, 662 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit estab-
lishes that mobile offshore drilling units are vessels ....”). 
134 FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 37, § 2:1, at 2–3. 
135 See 1 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME 
PERSONAL INJURIES § 2:3, at 2–8 (5th ed. & Supp. 2018–2019) [hereinafter 
FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES].
136 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
137 FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135, § 2:3, 
at 7–8. 
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and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.138 The LHWCA more or 
less borrowed New York’s Workers Compensation statute, applying 
it to those who worked in the maritime field ashore.139 Congress 
legislatively extended the LHWCA to include OCS workers with 
the OCSLA.140 Therefore, the LHWCA is a remedy included in 
the OCSLA.141
 The LHCWA differs from a “seaman’s” cause of action in that 
it is a true Worker’s Compensation Scheme.142 An injured employee 
seeking recovery under the LHWCA is entitled to a scheduled 
amount of compensation based upon their pay rate.143 The LHWCA 
scheduled amounts are far lower than the damages a Jones Act 
seaman could expect in negligence claim.144 The LHWCA is an 
administrative scheme under the Department of Labor with inter-
nal adjudications before reaching the Circuit Courts of Appeal.145
 However, the LHWCA does have a peculiar negligence fea-
ture in section 905(b).146 This section allows a non-seaman to sue 
a “vessel” that she is injured upon in negligence.147 Yet again, the 
“vessel” distinction becomes relevant.148
 Section 905(b) negligence is not the same as Jones Act 
negligence. “Vessels” owe a harbor worker only certain limited du-
ties as laid out by the Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation 
Co. v. De Los Santos.149 These so-called Scindia duties are limited 
to (1) the Turnover Duty; (2) the Active Control Duty; and (3) the 
Duty to Intervene.150 In all, they are somewhat related to premises 
138 See id. § 2:1, at 4, § 2:3, at 6–7. 
139 See generally N.Y. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (McKinney 1922). 
140 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018). 
141 Id.
142 See FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135, § 2:1 
at 4. 
143 See id. § 6:6, at 26.
144 See FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 37, § 6:7. 
145 See FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135, 
§§ 6:7, at 26–27, § 6:8, at 35. 
146 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018). 
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Manson Gulf, LLC v. Modern Am. Recycling Serv., 878 F.3d 130, 134 
(5th Cir. 2017) (enumerating the Scindia duties). See generally Scindia Steam 
Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1982). 
150 See Manson Gulf, 878 F.3d at 134. 
484 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:467 
liability concepts,151 requiring the “vessel” to notify the harbor 
worker of any latent hazards and to intervene when the harbor 
worker is a risk.152
II. THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT
A. History of Drilling on the OCS 
 Offshore drilling first appeared in Summerland, California, 
just down the coast from Santa Barbara in the late nineteenth 
century.153 Unlike the freestanding (or free-floating) rigs of today, 
the oil drillers built piers a few hundred yards into the ocean and 
built oil derricks thereupon.154 It was not until 1937 that the Pure 
Oil and Superior Oil Company built the first freestanding oil rig 
in the Gulf of Mexico.155 It stood in only 14 feet of water.156 Cur-
rently, approximately 1,862 oil rigs operate in the Gulf.157
B. Development of the OCSLA 
 Ownership of the seabed (and the resources thereunder) 
was initially decided judicially in the 1947 case United States v. 
California.158 California argued that it had control of the seabed 
extending three miles from the coast.159 Core to the dispute was 
the right to the oil under the seabed.160 The Court held that the 
federal government, not California, owned this three mile band.161
In response, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act (SLA)162
151 Scindia, 451 U.S. at 161–63. 
152 See id.
153 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https:// 
www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ [https://perma.cc/3N8P-2QRP]. 
154 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States
1 (Staff Working Paper No. 22, 2011). 
155 Id. at 1–2. 
156 Id.
157 How Many Platforms are in the Gulf of Mexico?, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENV’T
ENF’T, https://www.bsee.gov/faqs/how-many-platforms-are-in-the-gulf-of-mexico 
[https://perma.cc/RU2A-485W]. 
158 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38–39 (1947). 
159 Id.
160 Id. at 24–25. 
161 Id. at 38–39. 
162 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–15 (2012). 
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in 1953.163 In effect, Congress reversed the 1947 decision and 
granted the three-mile belt to the states.164 In turn, all seabed 
extending beyond those three miles was federal.165 This area is 
designated as the Outer Continental Shelf.166
 Alongside the SLA, Congress passed the OCSLA.167 The 
OCSLA applied federal law168 to the Outer Continental Shelf.169
Reflecting the interest in oil disputed in United States v. Cali-
fornia,170 the statute states that federal law applies to: 
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to 
all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected 
thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, 
and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if 
the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal 
jurisdiction located within a State.171
 The original act envisions drilling rigs as enclaves of federal 
law sitting in the middle of the ocean.172 Yet, confusingly, this would 
suggest that the general maritime law could apply given that it is 
federal common law.173 Fifth Circuit Judge DeMoss argues this was 
not the case in his reasoned dissent in Demette v. Falcon Drilling 
Co.174 Judge DeMoss notes that the Supreme Court rejected this 




164 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https:// 
www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ [https://perma.cc/3N8P-2QRP]. 
165 Id. Under international maritime law, the OCS is understood to extend 
outward 200 nautical miles—roughly 230 statute miles. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
166 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
167 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2018). 
168 “The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the 
United States ....” § 1333(a)(1). 
169 Id.
170 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1947). 
171 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 4(a)(1) 67 Stat. 
642 (1953) (prior to 1978 amendment). 
172 See id.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 23–24; SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra
note 22, § 4-1, at 146. But see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) 
(“There is no federal general common law.”) 
174 See generally Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–19 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
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application of Maritime law in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co., interpreting the statute as intentionally excluding 
admiralty law.175 The Court stated, 
The [OCSLA] makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by 
state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these artificial 
islands as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State. 
This approach was deliberately taken in lieu of treating the struc-
tures as vessels, to which admiralty law supplemented by the 
law of the jurisdiction of the vessel’s owner would apply ....176
 Had Congress disagreed with this interpretation, it could 
have amended the language of the OCSLA in the Act’s 1978 amend-
ment to explicitly apply the general maritime law to drilling 
rigs.177 Yet the only amendments to the relevant section extended 
the application of the OCSLA, by striking “and fixed structures” 
and inserting “and all installations and other devices perma-
nently or temporarily attached to the seabed.”178 The committee 
reports demonstrate that Congress intended this alteration to 
bring floating rigs under the OCSLA.179 The report stated: 
The committee intends that Federal law is, therefore, to be appli-
cable to activities on drilling ships, semi-submersible drilling 
rigs, and other watercraft, when they are connected to the sea-
bed by drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS 
for exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships and 
vessels are specifically not covered when they are being used 
for the purpose of transporting OCS mineral resources.180
 OCSLA intends for federal law, excluding admiralty and 
the general maritime law, to apply to drilling rigs engaged in 
OCS exploration.181 Indeed Congress went a step further, stating 
175 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969); see Demette,
280 F.3d at 505 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
176 Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). 
177 See Demette, 280 F.3d at 507–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
178 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-
372, § 203(a)(1), 92 Stat. 629 (1978). Congress also added language meant to 
exclude vessels carrying resources to and from rigs. Id. § 203(a)(2). 
179 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534. 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
181 Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355; see supra text accompanying note 175; see
also Demette, 280 F.3d at 505, 507–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
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that it intends for the OCSLA, and accordingly, its importation of 
the LHWCA, to apply to “ships” in addition to self-propelled drilling 
rigs when they are engaged in drilling.182 Thus, any structure 
engaged in OCS exploration—regardless of “vessel” status—is 
subject to the OCSLA, the LHWCA, and other federal law, but not 
the general maritime law or admiralty jurisdiction.183
C. Application of the OCSLA 
 But the courts continually do not acknowledge this con-
gressional directive.184 It is unclear why these courts do not delve 
into the OCSLA’s statutory language, but a pair of statements 
from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit may provide some 
light.185 In Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.,186 a pre-Lozman
“vessel” case that the Lozman court did not overturn,187 Justice 
Thomas wrote, “[A] watercraft [does not] pass in and out of Jones 
Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time of 
the accident.”188 Likewise, in rejecting Judge DeMoss’s argument 
that a jack-up rig is not a “vessel” when engaged in drilling under 
the OCSLA, the Fifth Circuit resorted to history and tradition in 
182 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 177 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534. 
183 Where federal law fails to provide an answer to a legal question, the 
court may resort to the law of the adjacent state. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355. This 
creates other legal issues beyond the scope of this Note. For a recent case con-
cerning the choice between applying state wage law or federal wage law on an 
OCS drilling rig see generally Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton, 139 S. 
Ct. 1881 (2019). 
184 See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2002) 
overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, 
LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). 
185 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495 (2005). 
186 Id.
187 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 123 (2013) (“The Court’s rea-
soning in Stewart also supports our conclusion.”). While Lozman is controlling, 
the courts within the Fifth Circuit tend to cite to Stewart, in its cases concerning 
“vessel” status and drilling rigs. Baker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
834 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2016); Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan 
M/V, 551 Fed. Appx. 749, 751–52 (5th Cir. 2015); Ross v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 
357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (E.D. La. 2018). 
188 Stewart, 543 U.S. at 495 (holding that a dredge is a “vessel”). 
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stating that, “Tinkering with the maritime definition of vessel 
would overturn a centuries-old understanding of what constitutes 
a vessel.”189
 But these statements ignore Congress’s power to define 
precisely what a “vessel” is and what effects that definition has.190
While Congress may have intended admiralty jurisdiction and 
the general maritime law to apply to those injured by harms 
arising from a “vessel,”191 Congress created a carve-out in the 
OCSLA: even the clearest image of a “vessel,” a ship that has 
stopped moving to engage in OCS drilling operations, has moved 
out of maritime law coverage.192 Leges posteriores, priores con-
trarias abrogant—subsequent laws abrogate conflicting prior 
laws.193 In the language and history of the OCSLA Congress 
made its intent unquestionable—it intends for all structures en-
gaged in OCS drilling to be treated as federal land.194 Allowing 
injuries on self-propelled drilling rigs to proceed as Jones Act 
claims violates the OCSLA.195
III. CREATING A CONSISTENT SYSTEM
 Is a rig worker engaged in drilling activities a “seaman”? 
The first question is whether the rig is a “vessel” or not.196 If it 
is, all signs suggest an emphatic “yes.”197 The rig worker has a 
189 Demette, 280 F.3d at 498 n.18. 
190 See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2019); 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2019). 
191 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). 
192 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534. 
193 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“If 
two inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the last ... is to be obeyed; and 
if obedience cannot be observed without derogating from the first, it is the first 
which must give way.” (citations omitted)). 
194 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969); see supra
text accompanying note 181; see also Demette, 280 F.3d at 505, 507–08 (DeMoss, 
J., dissenting). 
195 See Ross v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (E.D. La. 
2018). 
196 See Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“[I]f the tort occurs on navigable water instead of a fixed platform (or other 
structure attached to the seabed), the OCSLA situs requirement is not met.”). 
197 See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 391 (5th Cir. 2003); Grand 
Isle Shipyard, 589 F.3d at 784. 
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significant connection to the vessel because he is assigned to it, liv-
ing on it as a crewmember would, and the worker contributes to 
the vessel’s mission—that being drilling for oil or natural gas.198
But if the rig is not a “vessel,” then there is no option to find the 
rig worker to be a “seaman.”199
 But this conflicts with apparent Congressional intent.200
Congress specified that the LHWCA should extend to all fixtures 
“permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed” for the pur-
pose of exploring for, developing, “or producing resources there-
from ....”201
 The current scheme means rig workers have different 
causes of actions and remedies available to them based on the type 
of rig they are on.202 Moreover, employers have varying levels of 
liability based on the types of rigs they use.203 For uniformity 
reasons and predictability for businesses and their employees,204
this scenario should not exist. 
 By creating a federal maritime common law, the intent was 
to create uniformity for maritime transport across the country.205
Placing drilling rigs partially under maritime law in certain in-
stances conflicts with this purpose.206 Following Lozman, courts 
have two options to apply a uniform system for drilling rigs: (1) 
Find self-propelled rigs to be non-vessels, bringing their employees 
under the LHWCA;207 or (2) follow the rationale of Judge DeMoss 
in Demette and clear congressional intent by applying the 
OCSLA to all structures engaged in OCS drilling, regardless of 
“vessel” status.208
198 See Becker, 335 F.3d at 387 (citing Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 
368 (1995)). 
199 Id.
200 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (a)(1) (2012). 
201 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 
§§ 203(a)(1)–(2), 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 
202 See supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
203 See id.
204 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). 
205 Id. (“[T]he Constitution must have referred to a system of law coexten-
sive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.” (emphasis added)). 
206 See id.
207 See supra Section I.B.1. 
208 See Demette, 280 F.3d at 506–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
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A. Drilling Rigs Are Not “Vessels” Under Lozman
 The Supreme Court created a more restrictive test for “ves-
sel” status in Lozman.209 The Court laid out a list of factors that 
are all relevant to the examination, but no one factor—including 
propulsion—is dispositive.210 In the years since Lozman, courts 
have found numerous types of rigs are not vessels under the 
Lozman analysis.211 Yet, self-propelled rigs continue to escape 
Lozman analysis.212
 Two types of rigs are relevant: jack-up rigs and semi-
submersibles.213 Semi-submersibles use propulsion to stay float-
ing over their drilling location and can move short distances on 
their own.214 Jack-up rigs function like a ship until they “jack 
up” on stilts.215
 Applying Lozman to these rigs, it is important to look at 
how the Court described Fane Lozman’s home.216 The Court 
made clear that floating and propulsion are not determinative 
elements but rather only factors.217 The Court further consid-
ered the outward appearance of the home, remarking it looked 
more homelike than it did ship-like.218 The Court found the 
home’s outward appearance to be so important to the analysis 
that the Court attached an image of the home to the opinion.219
 Reading this description in conjunction with the Court’s 
“reasonable observer” test of whether a structure was intended 
to carry people or things over water, it becomes clear that the 
court is asking a simple question: does the structure look like 
and function like a traditional ship?220 Mr. Lozman’s home did 
not, and nor does a self-propelled drilling rig.221
209 See Maass, supra note 75, at 906; Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 
121 (2013). 
210 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 127–28. 
211 See supra Section I.B.1. 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 91–98. 
213 See id.
214 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
216 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121 (2013). 
217 See id.; Maass, supra note 75, at 907. 
218 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 122. 
219 Id. at 132–33. 
220 See id.
221 See id.
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 The Fifth Circuit has incorrectly suggested otherwise.222 In 
Warrior Energy, the Fifth Circuit fixed upon the Lozman Court’s
approval of Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.223 in which the 
Supreme Court found that a crewed dredge was a “vessel.”224 While 
the ATP Titan was a spar and the court eventually ruled it not a 
“vessel,”225 it misapplies Lozman’s “reasonable observer” test. 
 Drilling rigs look nothing like a traditional ship.226 Under 
Lozman, the courts should look at self-propelled rigs, much like 
Mr. Lozman’s home on a barge.227 It does not look like it is meant to 
actually carry people or things over water for the purpose of 
maritime commerce.228 This is an oil derrick placed upon a float-
ing platform that has some limited movement ability. Moreover, 
they tend to be affixed to the seabed for long periods like a spar.229
Applying this reasoning, the courts could do away with the split 
between fixed and self-propelled rigs because excluding self-
propelled rigs as “vessels” would mean they would clearly be 
treated as artificial islands under the OCSLA.230
B. Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent Deem 
Admiralty Inapplicable to Offshore Drilling 
 Notwithstanding “vessel” status, Congressional intent is 
clear that structures engaged in drilling on the OCS are not within 
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, nor can the general 
maritime law apply.231 Judge DeMoss’s dissent in Demette provides 
222 See Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan M/V, 551 Fed. Appx. 
749, 751–52 (5th Cir. 2015); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484, 
494–95 (2005). 
223 Warrior, 551 Fed. Appx. 751–52. 
224 Stewart, 543 U.S. 484, 494–95. 
225 Warrior, 551 Fed. Appx. at 752. 
226 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 2–4. 
227 See Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121–22. See generally 
Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 2–4. 
228 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121–22; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 
(1874) (“It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits 
of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as 
that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Consti-
tution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character ....” (emphasis added)). 
229 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3. 
230 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
231 See supra Section I.A.1. 
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an in-depth history of the OCSLA and the legislative intent 
therein.232 The original act and its 1978 amendment, read in 
conjunction with the Supreme Court’s intervening interpretation 
of the original act, provide a strong argument that Congress in-
tended to exclude admiralty from applying to all structures en-
gaged in offshore drilling.233
 The Fifth Circuit may already be moving in this direction, 
but in a confusing manner based on shaky logic.234 In Barker v. 
Hercules Offshore, Inc., the court interpreted the OCSLA as apply-
ing to a jack-up rig—a “vessel.”235 The Fifth Circuit held that a 
welder killed while supporting drilling activities did not have a 
maritime tort claim because drilling activities are not sufficiently 
maritime under Grubart.236 The court noted Judge DeMoss’s dis-
sent in Demette, agreeing that Congress intended to exclude 
admiralty from OCS drilling.237 Yet the Fifth Circuit created an 
exception for admiralty to apply if a tort could meet the Grubart
test.238
 Two problems malign the underlying logic. First, the court 
continued the Fifth Circuit’s insistence that the general maritime 
law applies in OCSLA situses.239 The Court cited to Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline v. Houston Casualty Insurance Co. and Smith v. Penrod 
Drilling Corp.240 The most recent case, Tennessee Gas, suggested
that section 1332(2) was intended to preserve maritime laws’ 
applicability to the OCS.241 Section 1332(2) states: “this subchapter 
shall be construed in such a manner that the character of the 
232 See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–19 (5th Cir. 
2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting); supra Section II.B. 
233 Demette, 280 F.3d at 504–19; see supra Section II.B. 
234 See infra text accompanying notes 235–38. 
235 Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2013). 
236 Id. at 217–18. 
237 Id. at 216–17. 
238 Compare id., with Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 366 
(1969). 
239 Barker, 713 F.3d at 218–19 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston 
Cas. Ins., 87 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1996) (“While [the] OCSLA was intended 
to apply to the full range of disputes that might occur on the OCS, it was not 
intended to displace general maritime law.”); Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 
960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992). 
240 Barker, 713 F.3d at 213–14. 
241 Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 154. 
2021] DRILLING FOR ADMIRALTY 493 
waters above the Outer Continental Shelf as high seas and the 
right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.”242
On its face, the section is meant to clarify that the OCSLA’s situs 
does not extend ad coelum (or perhaps more appropriately ad
mare) but rather is constrained to the seabed and those items at-
tached to it.243 This understanding is even more apparent when 
section 1332(2) is read in conjunction with section 1333(a)(1).244 In 
short, the Fifth Circuit misses the impetus of the OCSLA: the hold-
ing in United States v. California, which concerned control and 
regulation of the seabed, not water above it.245
 The reliance on Smith is misplaced as well. A common ques-
tion outside the scope of this Note is when state law will sup-
plement or supplant federal law under the OCSLA.246 The test 
for the application of state law under the OCSLA is (1) OCS situs; 
(2) the general maritime law does not apply in its own force; and 
(3) the state law is not inconsistent with federal law.247 But this 
is simply a recitation of the supremacy of the general maritime 
law over state law in a conflict of laws analysis.248 If a non-OCS, 
maritime claim goes into a district court sitting in diversity, the 
general maritime law takes precedence over any state law.249 Thus, 
if an OCS tort ((1) OCS situs) occurs in a manner that satisfies 
Grubart ((2) maritime law applies in its own force), then under the 
standard choice of law analysis, the general maritime law is ap-
plied.250 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reliance on Smith as hold-
ing that the OCSLA does not preclude the general maritime law 
is an incomplete statement.251 The OCSLA will incorporate the 
242 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2) (2018). 
243 Id.
244 Compare id., with 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2018) (“[Federal laws] are ex-
tended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ....”). 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 158–78. 
246 See supra text accompanying note 183. 
247 Union Tex. Petrol. Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
248 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
249 Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 
2002); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 4-3, at 156 (“[The general mari-
time law], when in conflict with state law, is supreme.”). 
250 See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at 1047; Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132. 
251 Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132. 
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general maritime law if there is a maritime tort (1) on an OCS situs; 
(2) that federal law does not cover, and (3) satisfies Grubart, such as 
an allision with a rig.252
 Notwithstanding the flawed interpretation of the OCSLA, 
the Fifth Circuit improperly found that under the OCSLA the 
Grubart maritime tort test allows for finding maritime torts on a rig 
engaged in drilling.253 The court relied on precedent holding drilling 
activities were not a traditional maritime activity, suggesting only 
a status question and not a situs question for the OCSLA.254 This 
risks creating confusion that could result in the absurd scenario 
that if a rig is a “vessel” and an accident occurs, then maritime 
law is appropriate because it occurred on a “vessel” in naviga-
tion, once again circumventing the intent of the OCSLA.255
 The Rodrigue court’s language that rigs should be treated 
as “federal enclaves in an upland [s]tate” should be guiding.256
Rigs are in effect islands or land.257 Thus under the OCSLA, mari-
time torts only occur on rigs when the admiralty extension act 
applies through Grubart.258 By way of reminder, under Grubart
for a tort on “land” to be maritime there must be: (1) a traditional 
maritime activity nexus; and (2) the harm was caused by a ves-
sel on navigable waters.259 Therefore, the only apparent way for 
a tort on a rig engaged in drilling to be maritime is when a ship 
allides with the rig.260
 Drilling activities are non-maritime.261 Therefore, so long 
as a drilling accident is not caused by a third party vessel, the 
252 See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at 1047; Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132. 
253 Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2013). 
254 See id.
255 See H.R. REP. No. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534. 
256 See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
257 Id. (“The [OCSLA] makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by 
state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these artificial islands as 
though they were federal enclaves in an upland State.” (emphasis added)). 
258 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2018). 
259 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 
U.S. 527, 535–36 (1995); De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 
187 (5th Cir. 2006). 
260 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187; see also 
supra text accompanying note 259.  
261 Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985). 
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Grubart analysis does not apply.262 It is as if the accident occurred 
in some “upland [s]tate,”263 or better put, an island.264 Congress 
decided to apply the LHWCA to all apparatuses engaged in drill-
ing through the OCSLA.265 Because admiralty cannot apply under 
Grubart combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
OCSLA under Rodrigue,266 lower courts should not apply mari-
time law to torts occurring on drilling rigs engaged in mineral 
exploration, but rather apply the LHWCA267 to such accidents. 
CONCLUSION
 Maritime law attempts to create harmony in the law from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific.268 The purpose is to promote maritime 
commerce by creating certainty for those who would engage in 
the market.269 But a two-headed hydra has arisen in the offshore 
drilling industry.270 Some rigs are “vessels,” exposing employers 
to maritime liability under the Jones Act, while others are not, 
exposing employers to the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation 
scheme.271 This creates uncertainty not only in the drilling in-
dustry but future OCS related industries that may develop such 
as wind and solar farming.272
 If an employee is injured on an apparatus exploring the 
OCS, there should not be a question of whether the apparatus is 
a “vessel” or what type of work the employee is engaged in. For the 
sake of uniformity and predictability, there should be a simple 
262 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; Herb’s Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 422; 
see also De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187. 
263 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
264 Id. (referring to drilling rigs as “artificial islands”). 
265 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534; see also Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–08 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 256–62. 
267 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018). 
268 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). 
269 Id.
270 See supra Section I.B.1. 
271 See supra Sections I.B.1, I.C. 
272 Renewable Energy on the Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-pro 
gram-overview [https://perma.cc/97TG-QTVG]. 
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answer. Congress decided to provide one with the OCSLA.273
Congress intended for all drilling work to fall under the OCSLA, 
notwithstanding “vessel” status. Therefore all employee injuries 
are to be treated under the LHWCA.274 Thus, employers have a 
simple, predictable scheme for their liability to employee injuries.275
But courts have continually failed to apply the OCSLA in this 
manner, electing to default to history, creating inconsistency in 
maritime law.276 While the simple answer would be to simply apply 
the OCSLA as Congress intended, the courts now have the option of 
redefining self-propelled rigs as non-“vessels” under Lozman.277
Whichever way the courts choose to proceed, they must keep in 
mind the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction, to promote maritime 
commerce, even if that means excluding a deep sea drilling rig 
from that system.278
273 See supra Section II.B. 
274 See supra Part II. 
275 See supra Section I.C.3. 
276 See supra Sections II.C, I.B.1. 
277 See supra Section I.B, Part III. 
278 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534. 
